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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Beyond phenomena, opinions and views also have to be changed in order to 
understand relevant relationships 
If we look at the different development conceptions about domestic 
infrastructure, we can realise that several proposals are based on experiences gained 
from well-functioning (or simply: functioning) foreign infrastructure systems. 
Although it is obviously extremly important to study, to know, such well-functioning 
systems, it should not be restricted to the description of actual functioning, but it 
should include a detailed analysis of those circumstances on which the functioning of 
the given system is based. 
To adapt the adequate tools and methods it can be possible only when the real 
conditions and modes of functioning have been revealed in depth. The assumptions 
that the Hungarian economy is an ill-functioning market economy or that the existing 
structure of deadlocked socialist development may - after diagnosing the deadlock - 
be abolished in one stroke and a totally new start is possible, are both wrong and 
misleading. 
                                                 
1  English translation of an article published in Hungarian as: Fleischer Tamás (1990) Infrastruktúra: 
helyzetek, nézetek, szemléletmódok. Közlekedéstudományi Szemle Vol. 40. No. 5. pp. 193-196. 
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2. THE EFFECTS OF A MACROECONOMICALLY COORDINATED REDISTRIBUTION 
2.1 The infrastructure suppressed by ideology 
It has been well-known since the late sixties, that the Hungarian way of 
ecanomic development, declaring with its ideological stance the priority of 
production as the only source of value added, forced investment occurred in industry 
and first of all heavy industry. Productive investments draw away resources from 
consumption on one hand and from the development of already existing 
infrastructure networks on the other. 
Criticisms served from the seventies as a point of reference in inter-sectorial plan 
bargains, while requesting for infrastructural branches (e.g. transport, 
communication, education, health) a larger share of budgetary sources. 
2.2 The cause of sickness is the insufficient amount of money: "More money for 
the infrastructure!" 
At the same time, a pseudo-objectivity appeared in sector-level desciptions of 
their actual economic situation. Whereas in previous reports only results were listed 
(which kind of establishments had been built and had put in operation), in the typical 
reports of the last decade an ever larger role was given to "frank accounts of the 
existing situation". These reports listed problems broken down to establishments and 
branches: means of production were old, replacement had been neglected, therefore 
there were regular stoppages in smooth functioning, total breaking down threatened 
etc. What was common in these reports, is that all of them suggested or even said it 
outright: the problem was that the given economic branch had not had enough 
money. 
If somebody knows only the report of one single branch, he is ready to believe 
that the budget has neglected the said economic branch. But from a broader 
perspective it is evidently impossible that education and health, transport and water 
supply, manufacturing and agriculture all have been neglected, and at the same time - 
metallurgy and extraction, construction and energy sector need a reconstruction too, 
as previously neglected sectors. 
It is clear from the above, that it has not be the special problem of infrastructure. 
Therefore the slogan that infrastructure should obtain more money is unfounded even 
if it can be proved true. 
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2.3 The "right" sector-level strategy: blackmail for more money by threatening 
with breakdown 
A deeper analysis of the above reports made it possible to place the infrastructure 
into the framework of the national economy. Thereby the hierarchic, overcentralised, 
overpoliticised use of power and the centralizing-redistributing macroeconomic 
mechanisms had as their logical consequence the helplessness of all the economy. As 
a result of the above mechanisms, instead of concentrating on the rudimentary 
market and the consumer, both firms and the sectors as a whole concentrate almost 
exclusively on their share in the budgetary distribution. Therefore, survival strategies 
too are linked to shares in the distribution process. Those, who can prove their 
indispensability for the national economy, can catche the interest of the central 
distributor. The more severe the bankruptcy one can threaten with, the greater the 
chances are to secure the appropriate resources. In this competition, peculiarly, that 
branch has the larger priority which can cause more visible harm with its being out of 
order, and thereby make potential victims his allies. 
According to this priority list, energy sector and heavy industry have better 
positions than manufacturing and/or agriculture: like among services productive 
servicing networks have more respectfull protectors than consumer ones. 
3. COORDINATED REDISTRIBUTION HAS A DISTORTING EFFECT EVEN INSIDE A 
GIVEN ECONOMIC BRANCH 
3.1 Even within the infrastructure: "Give priority to production" 
Within this logic it was important to differentiate between the productive 
infrastructure and the so-called "non-productive" infrastructure, what had previously 
been maintained by the already mentioned ideological varnish (the priority of 
production) and the whole edifice of socialist statistics and accounting system which 
were based on it: but until central distribution of resources is the decisive factor in 
obtaining funds, the distributor is constrained to make such decisions. It can be added 
that in the meantime "productive infrastructure" became the label of branches 
previously had been called material services. It is important to stress, however, that 
originally it had another meaning: and what is more important, it functioned also 
otherwise. 
3.2 The infrastructure also got money when it was especially important 
The above reduction of the infrastructure problematics into the logic of 
redistributive economic policy reveals not only the problem of distribution of money 
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among the economic sectors but also that of the distribution funds within one or 
another given branche. 
Centralized power structures and the behavior of looking at upwards have their 
impacts on further distribution of resources too. Not entire industries/branches were 
simply misfavoured but within each of them the consumers, the service sector were 
dispreferred, i.g. the lower levels of the hierarchy, which cannot be seen from the 
top. At the same time, it is important an economically underpining hierarchic power 
were estalished in each branches. The radial elements of different networks (center - 
country center - subcenter) could be mentioned here, such as the one-way central 
radio and TV networks, hot lines in the telephone network, the establishments of 
wholesale trade; hierarchy was an important element of educational and health 
networks too (not even to mention defence and strategic industries that support it). 
A further related problem is that the logic of hierarchic networks dominates the 
centralized model of regional development too and necessarily reflects in the 
structure of power in space as well. 
Turning back to the distribution aspect of the problem, one should declare that it 
was not infrastructure in general which did not get enough money, but it can 
revealed selectively, which areas did and which ones did not get money. All the 
above could be analyzed inside the given branches too related to the mechanisms of 
redistributive resource allocation and not separately from that. 
4. MARKET-COORDINATION AND DOMESTIC CHANCES OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
4.1 Instead of distribution: "More market in infrastructure!" 
Due to criticisms of the model of socialist command economy, it was revealed 
that several problems what planning couldn't solve despite its constant efforts, the 
autoregulation of the market solved them effectively. The task of government is not 
to substitute the market, but to secure its conditions. 
The idea, that the problem area of infrastructure may be reduced to the general 
problems of the economy, resulted in a new set of suggestions. On the same way, 
like within the logic of distribution the slogan "more money to infrastructure" 
became preponderant, the principle of "more market in infrastructure" became 
dominant inside the logic of duality of state and market. 
This principle is due, on the one hand, to a true recognition: nowadays there are 
no such self-regulatory economic mechanisms which would make unnecessary 
constant interferences. On the other hand, the suggestions rely on several concepts 
(such as: "infrastructure as the engine of economy") which are factually true for 
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functioning market-economies, but one cannot prove that they are the driving force 
necessary to make our present economy functioning. Instead, with references to 
marketisation and reforms, the unilateral shifting of burdens on the population began. 
This step is unilateral if it tries to involve the consumer's money into state-initiated 
investments without delegating the adequate decision-making authority. A typical 
example is the urban development tax, but several road-public utilities, telephone 
contributions, etc. behave similarly. But the path is unilateral even if it is not 
separated, at least on macro-level, from the principle of tying the source of financing 
to the task to be performed and does not involve a thorough wage reform which 
would mean the real transfer of the disposal rights. 
Industries, branches which are competing today for money centrally distributed, 
will concentrate on the customer (search for its needs, compete for its money) if the 
preponderant part of resources too, originate from the customer. Until the state is 
financing an important services (by keeping wages low) through budgetary 
resources, market cannot assert its real effects, the correction of the state 
redistribution remains the only option - instead of restricting the role of state to the 
correction of adverse market effects. 
4.2 Market environment is required for a real driving effect, for an effective en-
gine role 
In a functioning market-economy governmental infrastructure development has a 
pulling effect, and two main relationships assert themselves. Firstly, concerning the 
very content of infrastructure: networks assist regional development. This effect is 
characteristic for networks built by a state interested in boosting prosperity in 
general, local development in particular. But, as we have just mentioned, the state, 
being interested in centralized power, builds not such types of networks. The state-
built networks do not serve the goal of versatile local cooperation, the enrichment of 
contacts, etc. 
Another experience is the pulling macroeconomic effect of infrastructural 
development as an investment. In a market-economy in crisis, increasing demand 
becomes a pulling force through the outflow of wages that boosts production.  In a 
resource-constrained socialist economy, however, infrastructure does not behave the 
same way as does in a market economy. To increase demand, which is unconstrained 
anyway, does not lead to prosperity, only the imbalance between demand and supply 
as well as inflation is increasing. 
While treated in a separate way, infrastructure cannot be a pulling force in the 
sense of being able to pull the economy out of its distribution-type mechanisms. 
Quite the contrary: if infrastructural investments are increasing in the old structure, 
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the structure of the whole economy can be petrified for longer term than with a short 
term productive investment! 
5. COORDINATIVE SYSTEMS ARE BUILT ONE ABOVE THE OTHER: MARKET IS ONLY 
ONE OF ITS LEVELS 
5.1 There are both marketable infrastructures and externalities as well 
The economic approach to the problems of infrastructural, regional and 
environmental problems lead to the concept of day-to-day management and 
financing, nonetheless the concept of day-to-day management was formulated in 
terms of microeconomy. Thus, the problems of regional management or school-
building were based upon return on investment calculations, therefore, location - and 
resource - valuation problems became the subjects of profitability calculation. 
On the other hand, if we want to understand the macroeconomic effects of 
infrastructural development, we have to cease to consider the whole of infrastructure 
as a market. I do not deny that several elements of the economic branches, generally 
called as infrastructure - the majority of service activities (e.g. trade, transport, 
communication, water and energy) - should essentially function in a market 
environment. At the same time there exists an activity of network creation, which has 
no direct links with calculation of market return. The latter is the infrastructure in the 
narrower sense of the term. 
It is generally accepted that one cannot leave out of calculations such elements, 
which are not influenced, - or at least not strongly enough - by the logic of market 
return. 
The economic point of view is so pervasive that such phenomena are called ext-
ra-economic. Some of their elements are called infrastructure, background 
industries, - in order to express that they reach beyond the logic of return both in 
time and space. Others are called externalities, in order to express that they do not 
fall under the system of financial return (their return occurs later or further away, to 
somebody else, or perhaps it cannot be measured by money, the increase of the value 
added has no sense at all.) 
The case is similar with the category of environment, which, in a systems 
approach, means that from the point of view of the system examined only external 
relationships are existing between the system and its environment. 
It became ever more evident that there are very important relationships between 
social-economic phenomena and the above-mentioned external factors which cannot 
be neglected, because of the danger of unrealistic, hence senseless calculations. 
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Previous methods tried to internalise externalities, i.e. to incorporate them into 
the logic of management and financial return. Cost-benefit analyses first tried to 
characterise external factors in monetary values but efforts failed to express the loss 
due to an accident, the value of life, that of comfort, clean air etc. 
The other approach did not mean the incorporation of external factors into the 
one-dimensional system of monetary return but to extend the system of economy, to 
create regulatory loops around it. This is essentially the logic of the market economy, 
supervised by the state, that reacts sensitively on monetary flows but from a different 
value basis. 
In order to make intelligible the autonomous regulatory loops of regional, 
infrastructural or environmental policy, which surround economy, one has to reveal 
processes materialising in these spheres. Here against research faces a specific 
problem. 
Not only the names but to a certain extent even the characteristics of 
infrastructure, externalities, environment were determined from the point of view of 
a different, namely of the internal system. 
Those characteristics which express the divergences from microeconomics are 
very useful because they make it possible to differentiate among systems. But, 
wanting to analyse externalities in their relationships, characteristics such as 
longterm return, unexpressibility in money equivalent, etc. are totally irrelevant: if 
we want to describe an ecosystem it is totally senseless to rely on such properties. 
Perhaps it is not self-evident, but in the case of both infrastructural and regional 
development, one has to discard certain characteristics described above as important, 
because they do not follow their own system logic; and we have to search for other 
characteristics which could replace them. 
The system-approach will provide further help by inserting the systems 
investigated into the context of not only the financial-management system but also of 
one-another. 
5.2 What we need are stable boundary conditions and flexible feedbacks 
In order to reveal interrelationships, in the following I shall compare individual 
systems as for their stability in time. Boundary conditions of the functioning of a 
system "A" can be represented only by another system which is a structure, a 
framework, a skeleton in its relation to system "A", whose functioning is more stable 
in time, whose changes are slower. At the same time the control of system "A", its 
feedback cannot rely upon a slower system than only a system with shorter cycles is 
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able to sense effects in time and to offer information on it, thereby react continuously 
on the original system. 
One can formulate as a general law of evolution that the swifter system with 
shorter cycles is the more adaptive one. 
Therefore it is very important that boundary conditions of a system follow the 
logic of a more stable system, but the signalling on functioning be based on swifter 
system(s). 
The majority of the above mentioned systems can be arranged according to their 
cycle periods. The most durable system is that of natural endowments, of the 
environment, social structures are somewhat more variable, than come regional, 
settlement- and infrastructural networks. The latter function as condition, as "man-
made" environment for production systems which on their turn are data for the world 
of business, commodity - market relations etc. 
These rules of tendency have an important role when deciding on development 
priorities. 
To use an (often misunderstood) expression borrowed from studies on 
infrastructural development, we have follower-type development when a more 
variable, more adaptive system determines a structure and distorts emerging elements 
of the slower system. In this way the internal balance of the slower system is upset 
but the system is unable to signal back quickly, the distortions accumulate up to the 
total collapse of the system. This is the case when the state directly interferes with 
production, and regional and infrastructural networks are adapted to the production 
(even more: development does not take into account natural environment and 
endowments). 
5.3 To measure symptoms and to construct structures 
The principle of necessary state interventions, that of the different partial policies 
should be the following: to measure symptoms and to construct structures. One 
has to prepare oneself to the perception and evaluation of signals but one should not 
interfere on that level. Such a superficial treatment is good for nothing, when the 
deeper lying causes remain. In this way one can only justify the necessity of further 
and further interference. (This is sometimes in the interests of interfering institutions 
and persons!) 
Interference has to take into account the changes in systems which are more ra-
pid than that on the level of the interference but which fit into the previous, higher 
order system (otherwise the latter system would be constrained to follower type 
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change). This requirement, evidently, cannot be always fulfilled, but the principle has 
to be acknowledged. 
To return to our narrow area, evidently the one that can interfere with production 
with an aim of market orientation, but it is impractical doing it in order to trigger 
changes in production or in structures supporting it. A policy aiming at changes in 
production has to change the frameworks of production, i.e. regional and 
infrastructural systems and has to leave details to internal movements of the 
production sphere. 
Generally, it can be said, that self-regulating systems are more apt to fill 
structures.  
The characteristics of government interference into regional and infrastructural 
policy should be as follows: 
- taking into account the natural environment, its likely reactions (this is 
environment orientation); 
- only by knowing development laws of regional and infrastructural systems can 
we change networks (this is the leader-type infrastructural and regional 
development - or otherwise infrastructure orientation); 
- recognising interrelationships between regional and infrastructural systems on 
one hand and the system of production and services on the other, recognising 
likely reaction of production (services) to structural change; 
- providing market conditions for production and services as well (market 
orientation); 
- following actual reactions of production 
- in case of divergences, unintended effects, it's needed to review the whole 
system of relationships, possibly modify the original action on the level of 
man-made environment (but never by superficial treatment) 
6. SUMMARY 
In the Central- and Eastern European countries the neglecting of infrastructure 
first had an ideological basis, but the lack of interest has remained so far. While 
fighting for resources individual economic branches use the weapons and arguments 
of threatening with bankruptcy. If this state and the intra-sectorial systems of wastage 
cannot be changed, "modernisation" even with permanent reference to the market 
will lead to a wrong direction. 
The author treats market, environment and their interference as a unified system 
and tries to draw conclusions about the theoretical frameworks of a manageable 
regulation. 
